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A controversial finding in the field of causal learning is that mood contributes to the accuracy
of perceptions of uncorrelated relationships. When asked to report the degree of control
between an action and its outcome, people with dysphoria or depression are claimed
to be more realistic in reporting non-contingency (e.g., Alloy and Abramson, 1979). The
strongest evidence for this depressive realism (DR) effect is derived from data collected
with experimental procedures in which the dependent variables are verbal or written rat-
ings of contingency or cause, and, perhaps more importantly, the independent variable
in these procedures may be ambiguous and difficult to define. In order to address these
possible confounds, we used a two-response free-operant causal learning task in which
the dependent measures were performance based. Participants were required to respond
to maximize the occurrence of a temporally contiguous outcome that was programmed
with different probabilities, which also varied temporally across two responses. Dysphoric
participants were more sensitive to the changing outcome contingencies than controls
even though they responded at a similar rate. During probe trials, in which the outcome
was masked, their performance recovered more quickly than that of the control group.
These data provide unexpected support for the DR hypothesis suggesting that dysphoria
is associated with heightened sensitivity to temporal shifts in contingency.
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INTRODUCTION
Our perception of the effectiveness of our actions to elicit their
consequences shapes our sense of volition (Neuringer and Jensen,
2010) and personal agency (Bandura, 1982) and may be related
to mental health. People who are depressed often possess symp-
toms that resemble personal helplessness, yet it has been claimed,
perhaps paradoxically, that they may also be more sensitive to
the causal consequences of their behavior than others (Alloy and
Abramson, 1979; Martin et al., 1984; Alloy et al., 1985; Benassi
and Mahler, 1985; Vasquez, 1987). The strongest evidence for
this depressive realism (DR) effect, involves data from the con-
tingency judgment task (Dobson and Franche, 1989). This task
requires the participant to make an arbitrary response and make
a verbal or written judgment of the statistical relation between
the response and an arbitrary outcome. However, there are pos-
sible problems with this method as an objective measure of peo-
ple’s understanding of causal relationships. Here, we test mood
related differences in causal learning using a less subjective mea-
sure of causal learning, a behavioral test of contingency and
contiguity sensitivity measured over time, a method often used
to study contingency sensitivity (e.g., Thomas, 1981; Dickinson
et al., 1992) and timing sensitivity (Chiang et al., 2000) in ani-
mals. First, we briefly review DR studies before describing how the
present experiment will address interpretative issues with extant
measures.
The term DR originates from a series of studies carried out
by Alloy and Abramson (1979). Student participants were given
opportunities to press or not to press a button and observe whether
an outcome (light) was temporally contingent upon their actions
(key press). The programmed contingency between the action and
the outcome can be formally described by the∆P measure (Allan,
1980). ∆P expresses the strength of the relationship in terms of a
number between−1 and+1, allowing for negative relationships. It
is calculated as the difference between the conditional probabilities
of the outcome following an action [p(light|press)] and following
no action [p(light|no press)]. In most experiments, participants’
numeric judgments of their control over the outcome are then
analyzed for consistency with the programed contingency. Indeed,
much research has been conducted to determine the extent to
which ∆P, as a formal model of contingency learning, is an accu-
rate predictor of judgments (e.g., Jenkins and Ward, 1965; Allan
and Jenkins, 1980; Chatlosh et al., 1985; Wasserman et al., 1993).
However, Alloy and Abramson’s (1979) aim was not so much
to test the model but to assess the relative accuracy of judg-
ments made by student participants, who were either categorized
as mildly depressed or not depressed. A range of conditions and
manipulations were tested across a series of experiments, though
it was two critical conditions that engendered differences between
the two mood groups. These were conditions where the fre-
quency of outcomes was varied (25 versus 75% of trials included
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outcomes) but the difference between the two conditional proba-
bilities and degree of control was always zero (∆P = 0). Judgments
made by the depressed participants reflected this contingency and
in both conditions were close to zero, suggesting that they recog-
nized their lack of control. Judgments made by the non-depressed
participants, although low in the 25% condition, were higher in
the 75% condition and were consistent with the perception of a
moderate degree of control.
Based on these findings (Alloy and Abramson, 1979), and sub-
sequent replications of the effect (Martin et al., 1984; Alloy et al.,
1985; Benassi and Mahler, 1985; Vasquez, 1987), the general con-
clusions were that depressed people were realistic about control
whereas the non-depressed were optimistic in their perceptions
of causal efficacy. This evidence is considered to be strong largely
because ∆P is regarded as an accurate objective measure of con-
trol against which to assess people’s ratings (Dobson and Franche,
1989; Ackermann and DeRubeis, 1991; Haaga and Beck, 1995).
However, the interpretation of such findings as indicating
realism is based on the assumption that the experimentally pro-
grammed∆P (∆PProg) and the∆P experienced by the participant
(Experienced DP:∆PExp) are the same or at least very similar. This
may not be the case (Msetfi et al., 2005, 2007; Murphy et al., 2005).
For example, ∆PProg is defined as the difference between two
conditional probabilities. The first, p(Outcome|Action), is clear
as it is defined by the participants’ responses. However, the second
probability, p(Outcome|no Action), is ambiguous to manipulate
experimentally because it is determined by the frequency of not
responding. It is certainly not clear how non-events are defined
over time and therefore their psychological frequency, as opposed
to that which the experimenter programs and counts, is unknown
(Msetfi et al., 2005, 2007). Thus the ∆PExp is also unknown in
the case of contingencies where the p(Outcome|noAction)> 0. A
stronger test of DR might involve conditions in which the expe-
rienced conditional probabilities and ∆PExp were under greater
experimenter control.
Furthermore, other factors, such as response rate variability,
can influence the ∆PExp. ∆PExp is determined, to some extent,
by the relative tendency to respond and to withhold responding.
For instance, during 20 possible action opportunities if a par-
ticipant responds 18 times and withholds responding 2 times,
this sets limits on the range of possible contingencies that might
be experienced. Some participants tend to respond more while
others respond less even when instructed to sample both situa-
tions similarly. In extreme cases, the participant might experience
only the p(Outcome|Action) or the p(Outcome|noAction) rather
than both as intended by the experimenter (Matute, 1996) and
a skewed ∆PExp depending on the programming method used
(Matute, 1996; see also Hannah and Beneteau, 2009). This is a
crucial issue for any experiment designed to test sensitivity to
actual relationships. In fact, Matute (1996) has argued that the
DR effect might occur simply because the depressed respond less
than the non-depressed who respond at high rates and experi-
ence a more positive contingency. This interpretation suggests that
the DR effect is a result of response rate differences changing the
∆PExp.
Another obstacle to assessing perceptions of contingency
involves the dependent variable in these studies. Many studies
rely on participants’ explicit verbal or written judgments about
their perception of control over outcomes using Likert or similar
numerical scales. An alternative method we explore here is a per-
formance measure (see also Hannah and Beneteau, 2009). There
is some reason to suspect that the two measures might not elicit
the same judgment. Verbal judgments may be more sensitive to
disruption (Allan et al., 2005) and representative of people’s will-
ingness to predict that an outcome will occur rather than their
perception of the overall contingency (Allan et al., 2007).
In summary, we have identified three aspects of the standard
contingency learning procedure used in DR studies, that may
lead to equivocal or possibly misleading data with relation to
the DR hypothesis. These are (i) the ambiguity of ∆PProg where
p(Outcome|no Action)> 0; (ii) response rate variability which
may affect ∆P ; and (iii) reliance on explicit judgments of control
as dependent measures which are assumed to reflect contingency
sensitivity.
The current study was designed to address these issues. The pri-
mary change involved examining not the accuracy of judgments
of contingency but how effective participants’ responses were in
causing an outcome to occur. The procedure is based on a standard
instrumental or free-operant procedure in which participants are
instructed to cause an outcome to occur (e.g., flash of light on a
computer screen) as many times as possible. Note that in this pro-
cedure the outcome never occurs in the absence of the response
and, no matter what the response rate, the p(light|no press) is
always zero. Also rather than assess contingency as the difference
in perceived effectiveness of responding or not responding, the
procedure required participants to learn which of two responses
was more effective and that this would vary over the course of the
trial. This means that responding should be maintained on a given
action while it is more contingent, but that it should shift between
responses as the contingencies change.
However, in the two-response procedure we used in the present
experiment, there are two possible behavioral strategies that peo-
ple might employ. Previous research indicates that under similar
conditions, people tend to “match” their responses to the outcome
contingencies (e.g., Chatlosh et al., 1985; Koehler and James, 2009).
This is consistent with Herrnstein’s (1961) Matching Law in which
the relative probability of responding on each of the two behavioral
choices matches the probability of reinforcement. Alternatively
participants might employ an all or nothing maximization strategy
which might actually be more effective in producing outcomes. In
other words, when p(flash|response1)> p(flash|response2), then
the most effective means of producing the maximum number
of light flashes is to make only response1 and not response2.
In the conditions tested here, the maximization strategy could
thus be thought of as the most effective and normative option in
comparison to contingency matching strategies.
In addition, behavior that tracks changes in the probability of
the light flash might be claimed to reflect sensitivity to correlated
and uncorrelated actions as well as adjustment speed. Success-
ful performance on the task involves being sensitive to which
of the two actions is more contingent with the outcome and
then changing behavior to reflect the change in contingency over
time. Indeed, sensitivity to shifts in the temporal predictiveness
of actions for individual cues are argued to be an important cue
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to causality (Greville and Buehner, 2010). It spite of this, stud-
ies exploring the effects of depression on causal learning have
not so far included time based responses to contingency. Given,
however, that mild depression has been linked to a slowing down
in the perception of time itself (e.g., Gill and Droit Volet, 2009),
possibly through attentional mechanisms (Msetfi et al., 2012), par-
ticipants with depression may be less sensitive to temporal shifts
in reinforcement.
This leaves us with some interesting and testable predictions.
Across a number of conditions, mildly depressed people are more
sensitive to uncorrelated contingencies than controls (e.g., Alloy
and Abramson, 1979). However, there is little evidence to sug-
gest that sensitivity leads to more effective behavior. For example,
related research on learned helpless suggests that depression is
associated with passive behavior in the face of positive contingen-
cies (e.g., Hiroto, 1974; Maier and Seligman, 1976). Therefore, we
might hypothesize that, if realistic, mildly depressed participants’
response rate probabilities will be more similar to the programmed
contingencies than those of the control group. However, we would
also hypothesize that the response rates of controls will be greater
and produce a greater frequency of light flashes. Based on Matute
and her colleagues’ work on the link between response rates and
DR (Matute, 1996; Blanco et al., 2009), controls will respond
at higher rates or adopt a maximization strategy, and, conse-
quently, experience more light flashes than the dysphoric group.
Finally, based on research into the slowing effects of depression
on time perception, we hypothesize that depressed participants
will respond later to the switch in contingencies than the control
group (e.g., Tysk, 1984; Bschor et al., 2004; Gill and Droit Volet,
2009; Msetfi et al., 2012).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
University students completed the Beck Depression Inventory
(BDI; Beck et al., 1961) before being invited to participate and
again during participation. All participants gave consent after
being informed as the nature of the study. The final sample
comprised forty-eight participants who were assigned to the dys-
phoric (n= 24) or control groups (n= 24) on the basis of their
BDI scores. As with the majority of DR research (e.g., Alloy and
Abramson, 1979; Msetfi et al., 2005), scores of 9 or above indi-
cated dysphoric mood and scores of 8 or below indicated no
depression and membership of the control group. The groups
were matched on demographic variables, gender, handedness, age,
years of education, pre-morbid IQ measured by the National
Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson, 1982), and short term mem-
ory capacity (Digit span; Lezak, 1995). All participants were right
handed and all between group t -tests carried out on demographic
were not were not reliable (all t < 1.14). However, as expected, the
dysphoric group had significantly higher BDI scores (M = 15.6,
SE= 1.6) than the control group (M = 4.4, SE= 0.5: t (46)= 6.56,
p< 0.001).
PROCEDURE
Participants were briefed about the nature of the experiment and
read an information sheet. Participants completed the digit span
test, the NART, and the BDI. Instructions for the experimental
task were then presented on a computer screen, which participants
were able to read self-paced. The full instructions are shown in the
Appendix. In the instructions, participants were asked to maxi-
mize the occurrence of a brief light flash on the computer screen
by pressing two on-screen buttons as many times as they chose
to during each experimental trial. The button on the left could be
pressed using the left“tab”key and the button on the right using the
“return” key on the computer keyboard. For half the participants,
response1 was the left on the computer keyboard with response2
on the right. For the other half of the sample, this positioning was
reversed. Buttons were not to be pressed simultaneously or held in
the on position.
Each trial was 50 s long and separated by a 10 s inter-trial
interval. During the first 25 s of each trial, 85% of presses on
response1 – the “early” button – were reinforced immediately
with a light flash, while 15% of presses on response2 – the “late”
button were reinforced. Reinforcement sequences were generated
randomly for each participant. In addition, the outcome contin-
gencies switched buttons after 25 s in the middle of each trial. All
light flashes lasted 100 ms with no delay between the button press
and the flash. Dependent measures were response rates and the
probability of pressing the late button during each 5 s time segment
of every experimental trial [p(late)= F(late)/F(early)+ F(late)].
There were a total of 18 trials in the procedure. However, par-
ticipants were told that there would be some probe trials where the
light would be hidden from them, but that they should use what
they had already learned in order to make the light flash as many
times as possible (trials: 9, 12, 15, and 18). An on-screen message
at the end of each trial recorded the number of light flashes during
that trial. Finally, participants were debriefed, and paid a nominal
fee for their participation.
RESULTS
The probability of pressing the late button – p(late) – was cal-
culated for every 5 s time segment for each participant, across
reinforced learning trials and also across masked probe trials. The
analyses of reinforced and probe trial data are reported separately
below, and an alpha level of 0.05 was used in all analyses unless
stated otherwise.
REINFORCED LEARNING TRIALS
The p(late) for each 5 s time segment was analyzed using a mixed
(14× 10)× 2 factorial analysis of variance with trial (1–14) and
time segment (5–50 s) as within subjects variables and mood
(dysphoric, control) as the between subjects variable. For brevity
and simplicity, data are shown in Table 1 for each time segment
averaged over experimental trials.
Response probabilities did change across time segments, F(9,
414)= 324.51, p< 0.001, η2= 0.88, MSE= 0.273. Although the
effect of trial was not reliable, F(13, 598)= 1.495, p= 0.114,
MSE= 0.048, the trial by time segment interaction was signifi-
cant, F(117, 5382)= 6.93, p< 0.001,η2= 0.13, MSE= 0.024, with
response probabilities increasingly matching programmed con-
tingencies as learning progressed. This trend did not depend
on mood group however, as the three-way interaction between
trial, time segment, and mood group was not significant (F < 1).
However, there was a significant main effect of mood F(1,
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Table 1 | Mean probability of responding on the late button [p(late)]
for the control and dysphoric groups during each 5 s time segment
averaged over 14 reinforced trials.
Time (s) M SE Contingency
comparison
0.15 or 0.85
Maximization
comparison
0 or 1
t p t p
CONTROL GROUP
5 0.173 0.028 0.819 0.421 6.182 <0.001
10 0.135 0.027 −0.563 0.579 4.921 <0.001
15 0.126 0.027 −0.874 0.391 4.65 <0.001
20 0.112 0.027 −1.379 0.181 4.128 <0.001
25 0.119 0.026 −1.194 0.245 4.513 <0.001
30 0.574 0.019 −14.605 <0.001 −22.532 <0.001
35 0.861 0.027 0.42 0.678 −5.094 <0.001
40 0.879 0.027 1.062 0.299 −4.448 <0.001
45 0.89 0.025 1.579 0.128 −4.326 <0.001
50 0.896 0.023 1.964 0.062 −4.477 <0.001
DYSPHORIC GROUP
5 0.211 0.040 1.538 0.138 5.291 <0.001
10 0.177 0.035 0.753 0.459 5.016 <0.001
15 0.154 0.036 0.125 0.902 4.463 <0.001
20 0.158 0.033 0.252 0.803 4.789 <0.001
25 0.171 0.035 0.587 0.563 4.779 <0.001
30 0.627 0.015 −15.246 <0.001 25.487 <0.001
35 0.874 0.026 0.942 0.356 −4.918 <0.001
40 0.882 0.027 1.178 0.251 −4.403 <0.001
45 0.884 0.025 1.404 0.174 −4.716 <0.001
50 0.868 0.025 0.716 0.481 −5.34 <0.001
These comparisons were made using single sample t-tests and the alpha level
was ameliorated to α=0.00125 for 40 comparisons.
46)= 4.43, p= 0.041, η2= 0.088, MSE= 0.221. Dysphoric par-
ticipants p(late) was higher (M = 0.501, SE= 0.01) than controls
(M = 0.476, SE= 0.01) throughout the reinforced learning trials.
The main effect of mood on response probabilities does not
indicate whether participants were using a contingency matching
strategy or a maximization strategy. Consider that if responses are
distributed across buttons in a manner consistent with the pro-
grammed contingency (0.15 and 0.85) or maximization (0 and
1), then the response probability should average out at 0.50 over
the course of each experimental trial. As dysphoric participants
responded on the late button with a probability of 0.500 and this
was significantly higher than controls, who responded at a prob-
ability of 0.476, this is evidence of responding which is closer to
one of those strategies. In order to explore this further, the p(late)
was compared to the DP programmed at the same time points and
to values consistent with a maximization strategy (see Table 1)
using a series of single samples t -tests. The alpha level for these
tests was ameliorated to account for multiple comparisons, where
α= 0.05/40 comparisons= 0.00125.
Table 1 shows that for both groups, response probabilities dur-
ing 9 of the 10 time segments were not significantly different from
the programmed contingencies but were significantly different
Table 2 | Absolute frequency of response for the control and dysphoric
groups during each 5 s time segment averaged over the early and late
buttons and the 14 reinforced trials.
Time (s) Control group Dysphoric group
M SE M SE
5 9.73 0.844 11.49 0.701
10 11.9 0.900 13.2 0.787
15 11.7 0.826 12.96 0.749
20 11.57 0.789 12.73 0.718
25 11.36 0.768 12.71 0.712
30 11.67 0.812 12.86 0.737
35 11.94 0.772 13.22 0.731
40 11.64 0.715 13.13 0.787
45 11.56 0.707 13.13 0.804
50 11.46 0.703 13.11 0.801
from maximization probabilities throughout. Thus participants’
responses matched contingencies rather than being consistent with
the more effective maximization strategy. However, as the dys-
phoric group achieved an average response probability of 0.500
overall (see above), which was significantly higher than that of
controls (p= 0.04), this is suggestive of a general increased prob-
ability sensitivity in the dysphoric group. Greater sensitivity could
also be indicated by a more rapid switch in response probabili-
ties between the two buttons at 25 s. However, as there were no
significant interactions involving mood and time segment, F < 1,
there was no evidence for any mood related changes in this type
of contingency sensitivity.
In order to check whether the group effect on response prob-
abilities reported above was related to mood related changes in
response propensity, we also examined absolute response fre-
quencies. The data were then analyzed using a similar analy-
sis of variance strategy to that described above, with trial (14),
time segment (10), and button (early, late) as within subjects
variables and mood as the between subjects variable and are
shown below in Table 2 averaged over trials and button. Over-
all response frequencies increased over trials, from an average
of 140.50 (SE= 11.10) on Trial 1 to 279.5 (SE= 11.31) on Trial
14, F(13, 598)= 45.17, p< 0.001, MSE= 76.42, and over time
segments, F(9, 414)= 21.20, p< 0.001, MSE= 20.29. The dys-
phoric group responded on average 257.1 times during each trial
(SE= 15.1), while controls made fewer responses (M = 229.1,
SE= 15.1). However, the mood effect was not reliable, F(1,
46)= 1.73, p= 0.195.
Finally, response frequency data was used to calculate a mea-
sure of the effectiveness of responding over reinforced trials
in terms of light flashes produced [effectiveness= First 25 s (F
Early× 0.85)+ (F Late× 0.15); Second 25 s (F Early× 0.15)+ (F
Late× 0.85)]. These data were analyzed using a mixed analysis of
variance, with trials (14) and trial half (first 25 s, second 25 s) as
the repeated measures factors. Mood was the between subjects fac-
tor. Response effectiveness improved over trials, F(13, 32)= 19.35,
p< 0.001. Although the dysphoric group produced more flashes
(M = 93.72, SE= 5.1) than controls (M = 84.9, SE= 5.1), the
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Table 3 | Mean probability of responding on the late button [p(late)]
for the control and dysphoric groups during each 5 s time segment
and on average (labeled M) for each the four masked probe trials.
Time
segment
in s
Probe 1 Probe 2 Probe 3 Probe 4
M SE M SE M SE M SE
CONTROL GROUP
5 0.028 0.022 0.079 0.044 0.071 0.041 0.032 0.020
10 0.144 0.039 0.164 0.052 0.134 0.052 0.098 0.048
15 0.134 0.041 0.26 0.07 0.142 0.052 0.135 0.049
20 0.201 0.051 0.381 0.082 0.179 0.059 0.214 0.068
25 0.322 0.078 0.519 0.084 0.343 0.079 0.332 0.058
30 0.505 0.081 0.702 0.066 0.642 0.072 0.75 0.068
35 0.668 0.056 0.774 0.066 0.809 0.07 0.886 0.047
40 0.724 0.064 0.727 0.069 0.905 0.044 0.892 0.055
45 0.719 0.063 0.726 0.066 0.921 0.037 0.914 0.046
50 0.74 0.062 0.708 0.076 0.828 0.07 0.873 0.053
M 0.419* 0.023 0.504 0.025 0.498 0.03 0.513 0.021
DYSPHORIC GROUP
5 0.068 0.039 0.167 0.061 0.164 0.054 0.14 0.052
10 0.271 0.066 0.214 0.07 0.111 0.045 0.148 0.052
15 0.221 0.056 0.179 0.065 0.138 0.052 0.18 0.063
20 0.291 0.061 0.245 0.057 0.19 0.06 0.189 0.063
25 0.491 0.07 0.433 0.076 0.37 0.074 0.259 0.069
30 0.651 0.069 0.62 0.084 0.645 0.071 0.606 0.073
35 0.698 0.061 0.786 0.059 0.76 0.069 0.731 0.073
40 0.707 0.068 0.853 0.042 0.809 0.056 0.844 0.048
45 0.76 0.051 0.793 0.06 0.839 0.059 0.873 0.043
50 0.769 0.065 0.79 0.054 0.849 0.056 0.816 0.059
M 0.493* 0.020 0.508 0.021 0.488 0.026 0.479 0.022
Between group differences are emphasized in bold, *indicates the level of
significance=0.018.
mood effect was again not significant, F(1, 44)= 1.47, p= 0.231,
nor were any of the interactions involving mood.
Response rate and response effectiveness data from rein-
forced trials therefore shows that controls did not produce more
responses than the dysphoric group or receive more light flashes.
MASKED PROBE TRIALS
As with reinforced trials, we calculated p(late) values for each time
segment of the four masked probe trials. These data are shown
in Table 3, along with the average p(late) across each probe trial.
Inspection of these data shows that, in spite of the light flashes
being masked, participants were able to maintain appropriate per-
formance and switch responding from the early to the late buttons
midway through the each trial.
The results of the mixed factorial analysis of variance were
consistent with these observations, with the effects of trial, time
segment and the trial by time segment interaction being signif-
icant, all F > 2.62, all p< 0.04. Of more interest, however, were
mood effects. The trial by mood interaction was significant, F(3,
138)= 3.28, p= 0.023, η2= 0.07, MSE= 0.08. Tests of the simple
FIGURE 1 | Response frequency on the early and late buttons during
each probe trial averaged over time segment for the control and
dysphoric groups. Error bars correspond to the standard error of the mean.
effects of mood on p(late) during each probe trial showed that
the control group responded significantly less than the dysphoric
group overall during the first probe trial, p= 0.018, but not the
second third or fourth probe trials, all ps> 0.26.
Response frequencies on each button were also examined for
each time segment of each probe trial and are shown in Figure 1
averaged over time segment. The data were analyzed with trial
(4), time segment (10), and button (early, late) as within sub-
jects variables and mood as the between subjects variable. As
expected, response frequencies increased over the four probe tri-
als, and also depended on button, and time segment, all Fs> 5.31,
all ps< 0.001. Of interest here were the effects involving mood.
Figure 1 suggests that mood effects were present in the first
probe trial but not subsequent trials. This observation was con-
sistent with the significant mood by trial by button interaction,
F(3, 138)= 4.29, p= 0.006, η2= 0.085, MSE= 116.61. Further
analysis of this interaction showed that the mood by button inter-
action was only significant in the first probe trial, F(1, 46)= 7.42,
p= 0.009, η2= 0.139, MSE= 178.92, and not the subsequent
probe trials, all Fs< 1.11, all ps> 0.29. The source of the mood
difference in Probe trial 1 was revealed through simple effects
analyses, and showed that the dysphoric group responded signif-
icantly higher on the late button than the early button, p= 0.03,
and that this was at a significantly higher level than controls,
p= 0.013.
Response effectiveness scores were calculated for each probe
trial (see Figure 2). These data were analyzed with a mixed analy-
sis of variance with time segment (first 25 s, second 25 s), and trial
number (1–4) as repeated measures factors. Mood was the between
subjects factor. Response effectiveness increased significantly over
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FIGURE 2 | Response effectiveness scores during the first 25 s and
second 25 s of each probe trial for the control and dysphoric groups.
Error bars correspond to the standard error of the mean.
the four probe trials, F(3, 138)= 29.49, p< 0.001, η2= 0.39,
MSE= 372.03, but depended on whether responses were made in
the first or second half of the trial, F(3, 138)= 4.22, p= 0.007,
η2= 0.084, MSE= 156.24, and mood group, F(3, 138)= 6.15,
p= 0.001, η2= 0.118, MSE= 156.24. Further analysis of this
three-way interaction between trial, time segment, and mood
involved examining the simple interactions between time seg-
ment and mood group for each probe trial. The time by mood
interaction was only significant for the first probe trial, F(1,
46)= 6.82, p= 0.012, η2= 0.129, MSE= 322.79, but not sub-
sequent probe trials, all ps> 0.18. Thus, probe trial 1 was the
source of mood effects on response effectiveness, where there
was no difference between mood groups in the first 25 s of the
first probe trial, p= 0.73. However, the dysphoric group signif-
icantly improved their effectiveness by the second 25 s of the
first probe trial, p< 0.001, and the difference between their effec-
tiveness and that of the control group approached the level of
significance, p= 0.058. The control group’s performance did not
improve during the first probe trial, p= 0.54. This data indi-
cates that the dysphoric group recovered from the detrimen-
tal effect on performance of masked trials more rapidly than
controls.
The data from masked probe trials shows that the effects of
mood were only evident on the first probe trial. The probability
that the control group pressed the late button during this trial
was lower in comparison to the dysphoric group. This between
groups difference was due to the dysphoric group returning to
higher levels of response frequency and response effectiveness in
the second half of the first trial with their responses on the late
button.
DISCUSSION
Participants in this study “matched” their responding to the
programmed reinforcement contingencies (e.g., Chatlosh et al.,
1985). They did not use what would have been a more effec-
tive, but more effortful, all or nothing maximization strategy
(Koehler and James, 2009). In other words, they would have
produced more outcomes had they made all responses on one
button in the first half of each trial [p(early)= 1, p(late)= 0]
and then switched to the other button during the second half
[p(early)= 0, p(late)= 1]. In general, on reinforced trials, the
dysphoric group matched their behavior more closely to the con-
tingencies than controls. Although there was no evidence that
the mood groups differed in the extent to which they responded
to the temporal shift in reinforcement. When reinforcement was
masked during the probe trials, both groups performance suf-
fered initially, but the dysphoric group recovered more quickly.
These findings will be discussed in more detail below in relation
to the DR hypothesis and the methodological issues raised in the
introduction.
In the introduction, we noted several possible methodological
issues with DR research, carried out by ourselves and others (e.g.,
Alloy and Abramson, 1979; Msetfi et al., 2005), that has utilized
standard contingency judgment procedures. These included the
ambiguity of the∆PProg, especially in conditions with a non-zero
p(light|no press) or long periods of inter-trial interval (Msetfi et al.,
2005), and of the ∆PExp, as a result of response rate fluctuations
(e.g., Matute, 1996). Finally, explicit verbal or written judgments
of control may produce a biased test of contingency sensitivity and
the DR hypothesis (Allan et al., 2007).
We found that when participants were exposed to the rein-
forcement of the light flash during learning trials, the dysphoric
group responded overall in a manner that was more consistent
with the programmed contingencies than the controls. Consider
that the programmed contingencies on each lever were∆P = 0.85
and ∆P = 0.15, the average of which is 0.50 over the course of
each experimental trial. Both groups behavior “matched” the pro-
grammed contingencies, but the dysphoric group produced an
average p(late) of 0.5, consistent with the programmed average,
and significantly higher than controls. In order to produce this
pattern of probabilities, participants were required, not only to be
sensitive to the programmed contingencies, but also to match their
behavior rapidly and closely to the switch between contingencies
midway through the trial. Although there is some evidence that
people with depression are less sensitive to time passage (Msetfi
et al., 2012), and perceive time to be passing more slowly (e.g., Gill
and Droit Volet, 2009), there was no evidence here that dysphoria
was associated any temporal insensitivity to reinforcement contin-
gencies. In fact, to the contrary, it could be argued that improved
matching is evidence of improved contingency sensitivity and
perhaps DR in the dysphoric group.
This evidence for DR could however have been based on fluctu-
ations in response frequency rather than any particular propensity
to realism. It has been argued previously that response rate vari-
ability could produce deviations in the ∆PExp, as well as the
effectiveness of behavior. Indeed, helplessness and behavioral pas-
sivity is one of the classic symptoms of depressed mood. In this
study, it was not possible for fluctuations in levels of behavior
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to influence the ∆PExp, but it was possible that controls would
respond at higher levels, and that their responses would therefore
be more effective in producing outcomes, even if they were less
realistic than the dysphoric group. However, we found no evi-
dence that controls either responded at higher levels or received
higher levels of reinforcement (Blanco et al., 2009). In fact, overall,
the control group responded at a lower level than the dysphoric
group. On reinforced trials, this difference was too subtle to pro-
duce a significant effect on response effectiveness. Thus, whereas
the dysphoric group was more successful at contingency matching
than controls, there were no between group differences on rein-
forced trials in how effective behavior was in producing as many
light flashes as possible.
It was also important to examine responding in the absence of
direct exposure to reinforcement. On masked probe trials, both
groups responded appropriately and effectively, though perfor-
mance did suffer initially from the absence of reinforcement.
As hypothesized, between group differences were amplified in
the absence of reinforcement. We had expected that realism, or
an improved awareness of the causal effectiveness of actions,
would result in less of a decrement in performance when rein-
forcement was withdrawn. However, although response effective-
ness dropped for both groups in early probe trials, the speed
of recovery from it depended on mood. For the control group,
response effectiveness steadily improved over the four probe tri-
als. The dysphoric group recovered rapidly by the second half
of the first probe trial to formerly high levels. Essentially, the
dysphoric group required less time to recover from the with-
drawal of direct reinforcement. These results have several the-
oretical implications and suggest avenues that require further
exploration.
For example, these data provide no support for the idea that
depression is consistent with low response levels and reduced
exposure to reinforcement (e.g., Lewinsohn and Libet, 1972;
Lewinsohn and Graf, 1973). In fact, both dysphoric and control
groups responded at equally high levels. This finding is also incon-
sistent with Blanco et al. (2009), who found that dysphoric partic-
ipants, exposed to a zero contingency procedure with a high fre-
quency of outcomes, responded less and made lower contingency
ratings than controls. In the present experiment, participants were
exposed to positive outcome probabilities in comparison to the
zero contingencies Blanco et al. (2009) tested. Thus it might be
that zero contingency conditions are a special case that produce
lower response rates in dysphoric groups, which might itself be a
particular form of the DR effect.
It is also interesting to note that, in the present study, dysphoric
participants were less affected than controls by the withdrawal of
reinforcement in probe trials. Although response effectiveness was
reduced just like with controls, the effect did not last so long in
the dysphoric group. The effectiveness of their behavior improved
significantly by the second half of the first probe trial. One possi-
ble reason for this might be because people with dysphoria are less
responsive or sensitive to reinforcement in the first place and less
affected by its absence. This suggestion is consistent with negative
relationships, reported in the normal population, between mood
and reinforcer sensitivity (Glautier et al., 1998), antidepressant
administration and increased sensitivity to outcomes (Murphy
et al., 2012), and theoretical reinforcement sensitivity approaches
to psychopathology (e.g., Gray, 1982).
Thus far, we have interpreted the current findings as evidence
for DR. It should be noted however that, rather than evidence of
good learning, probability matching as observed in the general
population has been characterized as a non-normative tendency
(West and Stanovich, 2003). In comparison to a considered and
effective maximization strategy, contingency matching could be
seen as a “mistake” based on a rapid response to the situation
(Koehler and James, 2009). In fact, we hypothesized that controls
might actually adopt a maximization strategy based on higher
response rates. This was not the case. In this study, controls
“matched” their responses to the programmed contingencies but
not quite as consistently as the dysphoric group. However, it could
be argued that the current results are not suggestive of improved
learning in dysphoria but perhaps a stronger tendency toward less
than normative responses.
In summary, we have found dysphoria to be associated with
improved response-outcome contingency sensitivity using a time
based contingency procedure. Participants in the dysphoric group
produced responses that were more consistent with the pro-
grammed contingency over time than participants in the control
group. The effectiveness of their responses also recovered more
rapidly from the withdrawal of reinforcement. There was no evi-
dence for a link between dysphoria and reduced response levels,
experienced reinforcement contingencies or reduced sensitivity to
temporally marked changes in contingency. The findings from this
behavioral task are novel, as effective performance must involve
sensitivity to contingencies that change over time and depression
effects on causal learning have not previously been studied in this
manner. These findings provide support for the DR hypothesis,
though realism may not necessarily be indicative of normative
behavior.
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APPENDIX
INSTRUCTIONS
The task instructions appeared on the computer screen, and par-
ticipants were able to self pace through the instructions using the
“carry on” button.
Screen 1
In this game you will see a picture of a light bulb appear on the
screen beside two different buttons.
It will be your job to try to make the light switch on as many
times as possible. You will be able to press the buttons next to the
light bulb as many times as you wish in order to try to make the
light come on.
Screen 2
When the light does switch on, it will appear as a brief flash and
will switch off again immediately. We want this to happen as many
times as possible.
There are several rules to this game however!
∗You must not press both buttons at once.∗
∗You must not press and hold the buttons down.∗
Screen 3
When the game starts, you will see the light bulb first of all.
Then after waiting for a few seconds, the two buttons will
appear.
When you can see them, you can press them!
You can press the button on the left using “the tab key.”
You can press the button on the right using the return key.
Screen 4
There is no limit to how many times you can press the buttons (as
long as you follow the rules).
Just keep in mind that your job is to make the light switch on
as MANY times as possible.
Screen 5
When your first go at pressing the buttons is finished, the buttons
will disappear from the screen.
There will be a short delay, after which the buttons will reappear
and you can have another go. Each go at pressing the buttons is
called a trial.
You will have quite a lot of trials in this button pressing game,
and during each trial, you must follow the same rules.
Screen 6
During each trial, you will learn a lot about how to make the light
flash. We will need to check what you have learned.
Therefore on some trials a message will appear on the screen
saying “This is a test trial.” On a test trial, you will not see the light
bulb on the screen. Even though you cannot see the light, you must
carry on and press the buttons exactly as if the light bulb were on
the screen.
Screen 7
Even though you will not be able to see the light on test trials, the
experimenter will monitor how often the light flashes in order to
collect data. Your aim on test trials is to use what you have learned
to make the light flash as many times as possible.
There will only be a few test trials in the whole game, which
will take approximately 15 min. When the game is finished, a mes-
sage will appear on the screen. If you have any questions, please
ask the experimenter now or say that you are ready to start the
game.
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